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I NTRODUCTION American equityholders awoke in 2002 to realize they no longer could trust corporate financial reports. I Their doubt s extended beyond Enron and the Arthur Andersen finn! to a large set of companies with reputations for aggressive accountin g. Entire sectors were implicated, finance and telecommunication s most prominently. Securities issuers, oriented toward shareholder value enhancement by the corporate cultu re of the 1990s, had been adopting aggressive, even fraudulent treatments to enhance reponed eanlings, and their auditors had been doing nothing to stop them. The aud itors had sold their independence in exchange for consulting rents. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), some years before, had issued loud warnings about this dillY deal and its implications for reporting quality:' But nobody in the investment community paid attention so long as money kept falling from the sky during the 1990s bull markel. Things were different in 2002. As equityholders struggled in the worst bear market in a generation, diminished auditor independence triggered a crisis of EBOR 5 (2004) The auditors repeated an o rr-heard refrain when they demanded more guidance from the standard setters, and so failed to deflect the blame from themselves. Worse, voices from outsi de the accou nting profession responded to the auditors' defense by singing the opposite t.une: Maybe the auditors had too much guidance; maybe the problem was nOI a shortage of rules on matters like off-balance sheet financing, derivati ve contracts, and leases, but an excess of rules. The critics charged that GAAP's exhausti ve sysrem of rules-based treatments had fostered a dysfunclionai , check-the-box approach to compliance. Preparers and auditors applied the rules mechanically, ignori ng the substance of the transactions being reported. ' The rules-based system of regulati on, they alleged, fos tered a culture of non compliance in which reg ulated actors in vested in schemes of rul e evas ion. Harvey Piu, then the SEC chairman, led the charge against FASB and its rules:
'Present-day accounting standards are cumbersome and offer far too detailed prescripti ve requirements for companies and their accountants to fo llow. We seek to move toward a principles-based set of accounting standards, where mere compliance with technical prescriptions is neither sufficient nor the objective."
Capital Hill staffers, press commentators, and academics seconded Pin in blaming the crisis on the rules and calling for principles-based accounting.
Even Wall Street joined the call for principles, in a rare moment of concurrence with the poli cy community. Of course, Wall Street's moti vation lay in the assoc iation of princip les-based accounting with the Internati onal Financial Reporting Stand ard s (IFRS) issued by the Jntern ational Accou nting Standards Board (lASS) and se lec ted for adopti on by the European Commi ss ion . 9 The case for principles-based accou ntin g overlaps the case for regulatory interventi on to speed intern at ional securiti es market co nvergence, in particu lar SEC acceptance of financial reporting pursuant to [fRS. Principles-based accounting thus appeals to every intermediary o n Wall Street anticipating more rents from foreign listing business. • H.L. Pin, Testimony Concerni ng The Corporate and Auditing Accountabil ity. Responsibility, and Transparence Act, Committee on Fi nancial Services. House of Representatives p. 5. Avai lable on the SEC website at <http: www.sec.gov/news/testintony/032002tsh lp.htm> (last visited 26 January 20(4) .
• Effective in 2005, li sted companies in the EC will be requ ired to report under lFRS .
The way Ihus prepared , [he US Congress made its own call for principles when il enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOA),'" the legislation that addresses th e reportin g cri sis and auempts to res tore confidence in the securities markets. SOA institutes a new reg im e of reg ulation of the accounting profession , following the standard reg ulatory strategy of delegat ing the task of fillin g in the new regime's term s to a new administrative agency , the Public Company Accounting O versight Board (PCAOB). " On principles-based accounting, in contrast, SOA relies on the o ld agency, th e SEC, ordering it to produce a stud y of the US accounting system th at ascerlain s the extent to whi ch it is principlesbased (as opposed to rul es-based) and reports on the length of time needed to achi eve transition to a basis in principl es. '! The SEC Report, wh ich has appea red in du e course, II co nfirm s the relali ve superiority of principles-based over rutes-based acco untin g and hands to FASB the job of a gro und up reconstructi on of US GAAP. (dl STUDY AND REPORT ON A DOPTING PRI NCIPLES-BASED ACCOUNTING-I I) STU DY -(A) IN GENERAL -The Commission shall conduct a study on the adoption by the Un ited States fi nanc ial reporting sy:-tem of a principl es-based accounting system. (B) ST UDY TOPICS -The st udy required by subparag.raph (A) shall include an exami nation of-(i ) the extent to which principles-based accounti ng. and financial reporting. exists in the United States: (ii ) the length of time required for change from a ru les-based \0 a principles-bm;ed financial reporting system: (i ii) the feas ibility of and proposed methods by which a principles· hascd !-iystem may be implemented; and (iv) a thorough economic ana lysis of the illlpkrne nl:uinn of a pri lKiples-based syslem.
(2) REPORT -Not later than I year ,Ifter EBOR 5 (2004) This Article enters a dissenting opinion. The dissent does not follow from a theoretical preference for rules over princip les, however. [n theory there need be nothing objectionable in an initiative that privi leges pri nciples over rules in the articulation of accounting standards (or, for that matter, any other regulation). Principles, or in lawyer's parlance 'standards'. lead to more responsive and flexible regulation. The lawmaker announces a broad-brush directive in the expectation that more particular in structions will derive from law to fact applications over time. Because the principle guides each application to fact, principlesbased standards allow regulators to stay in closer touch with ultimate regulatory objectives even as they allow for variations in the facts of the cases. In contrast, rules-based systems tend toward formali sm, even as they also tend to include statements of overarching principles. Whatever their motivating principles, exhaustively articulated rules that treat, categorize and distinguish complex transactions invite mechanical application. In practice, the statement of the rule can come to dominate both the wider regulatory purpose and the particulars of (he given case. Problems result, si nce no system of rules ever can anticipate all future cases. Clever planners exploit the pattern of mechanical appli cation, devising transactions that fit the pattern but evade the regulation's spi rit. US GAAP is justifiably famous for reliance on such rule-based treatments.
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In the abstract, then, well-drafted principles may offer a better mode for articulati ng accounting standards. Unfortunately, the US reporting system's infirmities cannot be cured in the abstract. GAAP's rule-based treatmenrs and (he proposed move to principles must be evaluated in the process context in which preparers and auditors apply accounti ng principles. The process picture is not pretty. Professional standards have fallen to such a low estate that a near term shift to a principles-based sys tem would create a signifi cant risk of unintended adverse conseq uences.
Management decides on accounting treatm ents and prepares financial reports. Auditors merely review these deci sion s. '~ It follows in theory that auditors should be the most independent and adversary of professionals, ready at all times to reject management's treatments as unfair or noncompliant. Unfortunately, in US practice, corporate clients have captured the loyalty of their audilOrs to a degree comparable to their capture of the loyalty of their lawyers. Multiple factors contribute to this compromise of the professio nal relationship. Prime among them are non audit consulting re nts, employmenl opportun iti es at client s, and audit industry conce ntralion. '~ Now, had the Cong ress enact in g SOA been se ri ous a bout reali gning auditor ince nt ives and ame li orating th eir capture by the client interest, the statute wou ld have prohibited all nonaudit forms of bus in ess consulting by audit firm s. SOA, more cauti ously, opts for gradual improvement th rough periodic profess ional rev iew. It facilitates audit reform without assuri ng it , leaving it to th e PCAOB and the SEC to ad dress (or finesse) the problem of industry capture.
So long as management incentives respecting accounting treatments and auditor inde pendence remain suspect, the US reportin g system holds out no actor plausibl y positioned to take responsibility for the delicate law to fact applications th at are the hallmark s of principles-based systems. Principles, taken alone, do lillie to constrain rent-see king behaviour. In a world of captured regulators, they invite app li cation s that suit the regulated actor's interests. Rules, with all their flaws, beller constrain manage rs and their compromi sed aud itors.
Prin ci pl es-based accountin g Illay work well in other corporate govern ance systems or in the US sys tem at so me fu ture time. But Co ngress and the SEC move too qu ickl y in prodd ing FASB to mo ve immediately to principles-based GAAP. Priorities here need to be ordered wi th more care. The ince nti ve problems sho uld be so lved first through in stituti o nal reform that in sul ates the audit from the negative impact o f rent -see kin g and so lves the adverse se lection problems that otherwise im pair performance of the audit fun ct ion in the US. SOA, with ilS blank chec k agency delegati on, merel y start s the reform process. It does not take the concomitant and necessa ry ste p of reasse rting professional standards. Broadbru sh reformulation s of rul es-based GAAP should follow on ly when institutional reforms have succeeded. This Article' s subsequen t sections proceed as follows. Section 2 tra verses the US reporting cri sis, situating the ru les verSLI S principles de bat e in the conte xt o f rece nt audit fa ilures. The di sc ll ss ion shows tiwi the wave of audit fai lures impli cates principl es-based GAAP much 11101'1: tha n it imp li cates rulesbased GAA P. A story ahout Enron Ill uch in L' i rclilation also is fa lsified. According to the story, Enron exe lllpli fi es the :lbuses 0]" rul es-based accounting under GAAP and demonstrates the 11 L'~d (\lI1lIlVC III prin ciples. In reality, Enron violated whatever accounting stand:lrd s got in it s way, whet her structu red as rul es or pri nci ples. Res pons ibility for lilt.:' di saster does not li e at the door of the drafters of GAA P but at the doo r or those responsib le for implementation and enforceme nt, Enron's managers and auditors. Section 3 explains why GAA P, whi ch in fac t is founded on prin cipl es, ha s evo lved toward s art iculation in rules. The respons ibilit y lies less wi th FASB, whi ch has bee n ope rat ing as a EBOR 5 (2004) responsive regul ator, than with its constituents. The constituents, the preparers and auditors of financial statements, demand rules. Adverse selection problems in their professional relationships motivate the demands. Section 4 compares rules and principles in the second-best world of US audit practice. Rules hold out cost savi ngs and can enhance tran sparency. Principles make things simpler and enhance the comparability of fin ancial statements across different finn s. The problem is that principles presuppose an independent auditor who holds unmitigated professional power over the client and its treatment choices. In the absence of such an actor, the case for a principles-based regime rests on a false premise and holds out ri sks for audit quality. Section 5 concludes.
RUL ES, PRINClPL ES, AND AUDIT FAILURE
Proponents of principles-based accounting blame audit failures and reporting defalcations at firms like Enron and WorldCom on rules-based accounting and look to principles-based reformulations as a corrective tool. The rules, they say, are manipulated by managers, auditors, and consultants toward the end of reporting mi sstatement. A principles-based system, such as presently in effect in the United Kingdom and in IFRS, would be less manipulable and thus superior. No on e challen ges these assertions. But, as the discussion that fo llows shows, the charges are in significant part unfounded. This is not because GAAP contain s no manipul abl e rules, for it does. Nor is thi s because the rules have not been manipulated, for they have been. It is because recent corporate scandal s fo r the most pan do not stem from rule manipulation. There is no persuasive causal connection between rule-based GAAP and recent, catastrophic audit failures. Enron t thought to be the prime case where corporate failure can be tied to rule exploitation, turns out to be much more a case of human pathology than of poor standard settin g.
1 Standard setting and audit failure
According to the SEC's report under SOA on principles-based accounting, rules-based standards are characteri zed by 'bright line tests, mUltiple exceptions, a high level of detail, and internal inconsistencies.' A rul es-based approach, moreover, seeks to suppl y a clear answer to every poss ibl e situation, thereby minimi zing the need to appl y professional judgment. 'h According to GAAP's critics, thi s leads to transaction stru cturing and other strategic I. SEC Report. op. cit. n. 13, s. I.e. behav iour that unde rm ine s the qua lity of fina ncial repo rt ing.
'J Fina ncia ls thu s ma ni pu lated, while rul e compliant, do not truly a nd fairl y slate th e reportin g company ' s inco me and fin a nc ia l position. Comparability suffe rs as a resu lt ; Reponin g e ntiti es hewing to the sa me stri ct standa rd appear comparable on fac es o f th eir fin ancia ls when their arrangement s in fact are di ssimilar. " Princ iples, say the c riti cs, avoid thi s reporti ng pathology and lead to higher quality re porting; an e ffective system of accounti ng standard s must bui ld on principles and cannot be constructed e ntire ly of rul es.
The c riti cs are ri ght th at e ffective accountin g sl;lIldards mu st have a basis in princ ipl es. Unfortunatel y for the line of criti c ism. howcve r, GAAP exe mplifies just such a system. GAAP is not co mprised so le ly of rules, althou gh some of its direct ives are indeed set out in elaborately slaled ruk s rl'plL'lL' with bright-line tes ts, Illultiple exceptions. and internal incoll sistl' llc il' s. Many GAAP standa rds are pri nc ipl es-based. Furthermore, <\ ("ol icc lillil Ill' hroad and powe rful princ iples stand s be hind the who le. I ' L. R('I". ( 1996) p. 18.19 . Tension resu lts -there is no way 10 have :r system requiring verifi nbl e numbers and nt the sa me time offe ring fair va lu e ligures. That tension is being resolvcd in favour o f fa ir value as GAA P moves :lway rrolll a mandate that all reported numbers be hard numbcrs toward a system including m;II1Y numhe rs that result from judgment cnlls but that in theory o ffer n beller picture of the pro::sc nt v; lluc nf the linn . Note that SO A s. J08(a) directs FAS B 10 prioritize the cOllsidcJ";lt i(ln nf Il CW ru les rdlccting 'emerg ing accounting principles and chang ing business praclices.' Thi s pn,:sllllwbly mean s more movement \0 fair va lue t reatme nt . . T he Congress overlooks the fact thaI the same movement certainl y played a role in the accounti ng mess at Enron. where n';lr~ It I mar~et and f<li l" v.tlue 'lCl'ollllting or its derivative and energy contr'll'ts contributed mi gh tily III .\l l~(lil· i (lns 'lbuu t ils e:trn ings fig ul"es. See F. PartnllY. 71:.\"1; 1111111.1' 8<:/111"(' 111(' Set/ale (', 1/I/llIil1l ' I' (II/ Cm'cn/lllellTaI AJJi lirs {SS RN working paper IIA R ev i .~i o n i .1 View of EnrOll amI the Sudtkn Deal h of " May". available al <htl p:llpapc rs.ssm.colll/soi.1/papers.cfm?absl r;ll·l_ id;:::-I I 726 I > (lasl visited 26 Janu<lry 20(4) II. COlllmo n sense indic:Hes that we should read.iu'it Ihe balance in favour or verifi abi lit y. at least until the crisis has passed.
Other tcnsio ns come into the pi r ture whcn In' i"cl"crence two modifying l'Ol1ventions-ma teri-:tlity. which lets the audi tor disregard minnr mi s' lpplications of the rules. and conservati sm, whic h coun se ls underslatement ill l'nse of dOllbt. Between hi~lo r ic:l 1 cost. verilinhility. and I.:onscrvatislll 0 11 the Olle IMnd , ,md fair va lue alld nlllteriality o n the other. there is mllc h room for good faith dispute ,tbout the best w~ly Itl :-:late.1 firm's results.
EBOR 5 (2004)
GAAP's basic principles in a series of Concepts Statements,2/) collectively called the conceptual framework. This has ever since been the source of the objectives and concepts drawn on in the development of US accounting standards. 21 The overarching concept in the conceptual framework is 'decision usefulness'. It is in turn supported by the trio of relevance, reliability, and comparability.~2 Decision usefulness is achieved in the first instance through comparability. That is, similar transactions and conditions should be reported the same way by different ftnns and by each frnn across time. The achievement of comparability in turn necessitates standard setting. Relevance and reliability come into the framework at this point to assist the standard setter in articulating requirements for recognition of income, measurement of assets and liabilities, and disclosure more generalIy.~J As articulated within the conceptual framework, GAAP is explicitly principles-based, even as it contains many rules.
A critic might respond that other accounting systems manage to do as good a job as does US GAAP with materially greater reliance on principles than on rules. The UK regime often is held out at this point. As to auditing standards, the UK system does appear to be more principles-based than those in the US.
24 But the picmre is less clear with respect to the UK's substantive accounting principles. British accounting rests on eight Financial Reporting Standards, twentyfive Statements of Standard Accounting Practice, plus a thick supplementary literature. Much of this is as dense and rule-bound as US GAAP.2~ The same is true of lFRS.
2b One commentator, reviewing a number of systems for relative rule-based complexity, including those of the US, the UK and IFRS, found no obvious reason to distinguish US GAAP as a pathological outlier.
27 All accounting systems mix rules and principles.
More importantly. there is no clear causal connection between rules-based US GAAP and recent high-profile reporting failures. Those who denounce GAAP for excessive reliance on rules cite a number of subject matters. These Ge neral Accou nting Office's (GAO) recent report of public company accounting restatements permits us 10 gauge the ex tent 10 which these rulesbased subject matt er fi gures into the spate of accountin g failures. Since accou ntin g restatements pres uppose audi t failure, the GAO's compendi um provides a road map to accounting's ab used territories. The GAO report shows that the an nu al numher of restatements rose from 92 in 1997 to 225 in 200 I. From 1997 10 Jun e 2002. the total number of restatements an nounced was 919 :~1 These invo lved X45 companies, amounting len per ce nt of all those li sted on pub li c exc hanges ill the US. Iss ues involving revenue recogniti on, whether in respect of mi sreported or nunreported revenue, made up the larges t group by subject matter category. accounting for almost 38 per cent of the 9 19 restatement s:" The second largest group con cerned cos t or expense· related iss ues, accoun ting for almost 16 pCI' n: nt . ,. ThL' GAA P revenue and cost recogniti on standards bearing on thi s S4 per CL' lli majorit y group are for the mos t part principl es-based -they are phrased in ~e l1 e r; i1 term s and require signirica rll exercises of judgment in the ir ;lppl ica t i(lll . " WoridCom is the most famous recent case of these principks' opportunistic mi sll se . Ove r three yea rs WorldCom shifted around $8 hill ion or lillL' L' UstS (lver to ;ISSct accoun ts.
treating operatin g expenditures as capital ex p~nditure s, with earnings for the peri od of the shift increasing dolla r for dol lar. This age-o ld ru se fo r paddin g earnin gs impli cated neither hi gh·tech eng ineerin g nor manipulati on of compl ex rul es. '-I It was a bad fai th appl icati on of a principle.
T he remaining restatements cover a ran ge of subj ect matter, some of it rul es· based, but most of it principl es-based. On the rul es-based side are restatement s (2004) concern ing merger and acquisition accounting and derivatives:\~ More on the principles~based side li e restatements involving in-process research and development, related-party transactions, loan -loss reserves and loan write-afts, asset impairment, inventory valu ation, and restructuring activity. Jt, There is a si mple reason why rul es-based subject matters do not dominate the li st of restatements: Detailed rules hold out roadm aps both to GAAP compliance and the identification of GAAP noncompliance. Observers who disapprove of the rules-based treatments J7 dislike the reporting destinations to which the roadrnaps lead. Since these destinations tend simultan eously to be favoured by the managers of reporting companies, the managers happily comply with the rules. At the same time, a noncomplying issuer is more likely to confront an uncooperative auditor. Detailed rules hold out the benefit of enhancin g transparency even as they can distort the overall story told by the report's bottom line. They make it easier to see what compani es are doing, if only for the reason that the precise instructions narrow the room for differences of judgment. J~ Rules also ease verification. Detailed instructions provide a base of common assumptions and knowledge for both preparers and aud itors. Differences in measurement decrease as a resu lt. Noncompliance becomes more ev ident. oW And the auditor who di scovers noncompliance is more likely to refuse to let it pass given a rule. The rule provides it a clear-c ut basis for justifying the refusal to the client, minimizi ng potential damage to the professional relationship. Si nce the rule makes noncompliance more visible, it al so increases the risk of ex post enforce ment respecting the preparer and the auditor both, further strengthening the auditor's resolve. 
Enron and GAAP
Those who asc ribe rules-based standards with a causal role in the accounting cri sis point to Enran. At first g lance the citati on appears justifi ed . Mi sleading accounting treat men ts of transaction s between Enron and off-ba lance sheet entiti es lie at the scandal' s core, and the applicable accountin g standards are rules-based. Indeed, these rules' form over substance treatments are as notorious ly arbitrary as any in US GAAP. C riti cism of these rules has been widespread for decades. Eve n FASB consistently has joined the criti cs. For two decade s pri or to 2001 it kept open a project inquiring into an alternative approac h bui lt on a prin ciples-based definiti on of co ntrol.. lO' Unfort un ately for FASB, the business comm unity, particularly the securiti za tion industry, had come to rely on it s ll1astery and manipulat ion of these rule s, especiall y the labyrinthin e se t on tran sfers to off-ba lance sheet entiti es. The industry interests vociferously opposed reform . Exhaus ted by the oppos iti on, F ASB abandoned the project of SUDst;IIlI i vc re statement as a failure even as the Emon sca ndal was breaking. Laler. in the wake o f the scandal , FASB' s criti cs did an abollt face, sudden ly demandin g pri Ilciples-based reform. FASB responded by reviving the re forl11 proj ec t. and has since produced a succession of Enron-responsive ex posure draft s. " FASB 's rev ived reform project amounts to a tacit admission of sta nd ard sell ing failure. For all that appears, eve n the body respons ihl e for GAAP ag rees that its rules had a causative role in the co mpany's collapse.
1n ac tin g ou t the ro le of a defi cie nt lawmaker, FASB confirms the conventiona l wisdom circulating in the wake of Enron 's co ll apse. This story fo ll ows from the assumption that a di sas ter of th is magnitude never could have occurred had th ere not been a !law in the rules. The story has it that Enron ex pl oi ted tec hnica l rul es govellling Special Purpose Entit ies (SPE) in setting up and accounting for sham tran sactions . By carefull y but cyni call y hewing to the rul es, Enron managed material ly to overstate it s earnin gs. Had the rules been beller drafted, Enron wou ld have bee n fo rced to consolidate the results of the (2004) sham SPE:;: wit h its ow n results. Consolidation in turn would have deprived Enron of the opportunity to mi sstate its earnings. ~1 Generali zing from the story, rules-based GAAP's layers of precise instruction s eas ily can be manipulated by clever and ex pensive accountants and lawyers. Had GAAP taken a principles-based approach, articul atin g general and substantive standard s respecting the consolidation of related en tities, there would have been no loophole through whi ch the bad actors at Enron could have dri ve n their fl eet of sham SPE truck s.
The story is accurate in one respect: the rul es respecting accounting for tran sactions wi th SPEs we re badly drafted and incomplete. But in all other respects the story is nonsense. Enron, in fa ct, did not follow the rul es, Had it done so, the substance of all of its questionable dealings with SPEs would have been di sclosed in its financial statements. It follows that the rules did not fail. The failure lay with aCLOrs at Enron and its auditor, Arthur Anderson, Fail ures at FASB pl ayed no role. FASB's implic it, after the fact, admi ss ion of a rul e fai lure te lls us more about its weak ness as a political player than it does about the operation of GAAP.~.1
It is true that the SPE tran sactions at the heart of the Enron scandal emerged from an exhausti ve and strategic planning process. It also is true that the tran sactions were designed to comply with the rules even as they exploited the rul es' structural weak nesses. Under SFAS No. 140, issued in 2000, transfers of fina ncial assets to SPEs are treated as sales by the transferor finn so lon g as, among ot her thin gs, eq uity interests in the SPE are nOi return ed as consideration for the assets transferred and the SPE gets control of the assets with the ri ght 10 pledge or exc hange them . .I.I For the class of SPEs utili zed in the Enron tran sacti ons, all the planner had to do was make sure that an outside equity in vestor in the SPE vehicl e contributed capital at least equalLO three percent of the va lue of the financial assets transferred to the SPE vehi cle by Enron.
It al so is true that at the time Enron set up the critical 'UM I' and 'LJM ll ' SPEs and entered into swap tran saction s with them, the tran saction s arguably Illslt!;ld it was the type of transaction that is still legal. ') . complied with the rul es. But, as subsequent investi gati ons have detail ed at length , the tran sacti on stru ctures had intrinsic Oaws and went o ut of compliance with the three per ce nt rul e very soon after the transaction s closed . .!.' Had Enron scrupulous ly followed the rules at that point. it wou ld have been forced to consolid ate the SPEs int o its finan cial s. Had the SPEs been consolidated, the outco mes of the swap tran sac tion s betwee n EnrOll and the SPEs wou ld have bee n elimin ated from Enron's income stateme nt with the res ult that Enron woul d not have been able to pump Li p its net earnings with re venues and gains fro m SPE transactions. But, of co urse, th e finall cials were not consolid ated and EnrOll overstated its earnings by $ 1 bi llio n over fi ve quarters. But the noncompli ance did not result froJ11th e successful manipul at ion of flawed rul es. In stead, like Parmalat's managers on the other side of the At lan ti c, Enron's managers resorted to the old fas hio ned expedi ent of concealmen t.
EnrOll 's Iln ancia ls wo uld have bee n out of compli ance with GAAP eve n if the finan cials' treat ment of its swaps with LJM had conformed to th e rul es on co nso li dat ion of finan cia ls. Consol idation was not the only compli ance problem impli cated by the LJM transacti on st ructure. Under SFAS No. 57, co ntracts between Enroll and the LJM SPEs were ' related party transactions'. T hi s category incl udes tran sac ti ons with a counterpart y whose po licies are so in lluenced by the fi rst pa rty as to prevent one of th e parties from full y pu rsuing its own interes ts. G iven such a tie, spec ial foo tn ote descriptions of th e tran sactions are required. includin g doll ar amount impacts on re ported earnings.
J h The footn ote di sclosures would have provided in vestors with the substantive eq ui valent of a set o f conso li dated re ports. Bu t, of course, Enron did not wish to make clear th e truth respect in g thi s compo nent of it s re ported ea rnings, and it s cooperative audilor fail ed to in sist th at it fo llow the rul es on related party transactions .
An add it ional repo rtin g failure fi gured prominently in Enron's fin al col lapse. The stra w that bro ke the camel's back, fru strated a last-d itch resc ue plan, and fo rced th e compa ny to Il le for bankruptcy in Dece mher 200 I was Enron 's the last minute re ve lat ion of $4 billion of unre p0 ri l:'d cc ntin gent guarantees of ob ligations of unconsol idated equ il Y affi liatcs. The revd~J ti o n kill ed a bail outmcrge r with Dynegy beca use the hi dden $4 hillion o f o bli gation s materiall y impaired E nrOll 'S fin ancial cond ition and Wl'l'L' "hOll tt o come du e . .n As to these obli ga tion s GAA P ho ld s oul a cil:;lr inslrw .. :lion. To guarantee an eq uity affi li ate's ob ligations is to take thL' disclosurL' IrL';lI ment out of the pare ntsubsidiary or parent-in vestee co nt(:x t I'm tr(: ;ll rnL'llt und er th e standard s on Contrary to the conventional wisdom, then, the central problem at Eoron lay not with the rules themselves but with the company's failure to follow them. The Enron disaster stemmed not from the rules' structural shortcomings but from the corruption of Enron's man agers and perverse financial incentives that inclined its auditor towards cooperation.
The conventional wisdom errs in a second respect as well. The story blames the complex rules on accounting for SPE transaction s. It asserts that had FASB adopted a principles-based approach to consolidation of related entity financial statements, Eoron would have been di sabled from perpetrating its fraud. transac ti ons not covered in their en tirety by FASB standard-setting, For tran sac tions in the residual category, the criti cal requirement was a minimum ou tside equity inves tmen t. As to thi s the acco unt ing firm s used a three pe r cent rul e of thumb , derived from a 199 1 letter of th e Ch ief Accountant of th e SEC issued in respect of a lease tran saction ,''''' To read the 199 1 letter is to see that the SEC required three per ce nt outside equ ity fundi ng on the facts or the leas in g case presented to it. The agency never intended to set three per cent as a one-sizefit s-a ll , bri ght line test. During the I 990s, the SEC repeatedl y poi nted ou t to the accounting profession that no three per cen t bri ght line lest ex isted and that the level of outside equity fu nding for a qua lifyi ng SPE in the residu al category should fo ll ow from the nature of the tran saction, In the SEC's view, the question was whether, on the facts of th e case, sufficient Olllside equity capital had been in ves ted to assu re the SPEs independence. " The outside equity requirement was rhus inte nded not as a rule hu t as a tlexible prin ciple to be appli ed in the circum stances. But, th.::s pit c the age ncy's jawboning. the acco unting profess ion app lied the prirlL'ipk as a th rce per cent brigh t line rul e. That rul e-based th ree per cent was the ope ratiw ass umpti on when Enron planned the LJM transactions.
A di sturbing pattern of com lllunica ti ve breakdown and noncompliance emerges. A standard-setting age ncy articulat es a prin cip le and tell s US <l uditors to app ly it as such, The auditors instead bowdlerize the standard so that it operates as a check-the-box rule. At the leve l of practice, then , US audi tors manufacture rul es whe re rules do not ex ist. A number o r quest ions fol low . Why do US aud itors di splay a refractory preference for rul es? What preven ts audi tors from applying standards as intended? Will the behaviour patlern persist under the new pri nciples-based reg ime projected by GAAP reformers? Responses to these ques tions follow in sec ti ons 3 and 4, 2.3 Summary GAAP' s fo rm and content do need im provement and take so me of the blame fo r the US accountin g cri sis. There ca n be no denyin g that prac titi oners often take advantage of GAAP's rul e structures when they design aggressive treatments. Regulatory arbit rage -the practice or stru ct urin g an inappropri ate tran sac ti on q, The so it stays just within the bounds set by a rule~2 -c learl y is widespread. But these rule-based aggressive treatments, which tend to in vo lve structured fin ance, leases, a nd (until recently) pooled me rgers, do not show up in large numbers on the list of recent restatements. The reason is th at the rul es make the treatments GAAP-compliant, even as many observers di sapprove of the treatments.
The audi t failures and restatements fo llow less from regul atory arbitrage than from strategic noncompli ance -acti on unde r an inte rpretation of the law in conflict with Lhe stated interpretation of the regul ator. n Neither rules nor standards prevent such conduct, and , as between the two, rules have the advantage in deterring it. Meanwhile, in every case of a restatement, GAAP by definition has proved adequate to the job of identi fy ing the mi sstatement and providing corrective instructions. Under thi s analysis, the drafters of SOA were ri ght in thinking that the absence of principles has contributed {Q the cri sis but wrong in diagnosing the problem as legislati ve. This is not for the most part a prob lem concerning the relati ve merits of rules and principles in standard setting. It is instead a problem of professional practi ce in a regulatory system made up of both. It is the auditors who need to gel back to principl es, taking seriously principles already governing the reporting system.
TH E DEM AN D FOR RULES
We have seen that US GAAP literally foll ows from general principles. Yet it has become more and more rul es-based as articulated over time. This is not because its general principles no longer moti vate parti cul ar GAAP standards, but because US accountin g's constituents constantl y and effectively register demands for tail ored treatments. The propensity {Qward rul es follows from a supply and demand dynamic between the standard-setter, FASB, the audit finns, and their managemem clients. The demand for rules fo llows from auditin g clients' constant des ire for exception fro m rul es. When an accounting princi ple articulates a treaUTIent category and a set of reporting companies di slike the way the LreaUTIent applies [Q them, they (and th eir auditors) lobby for an exception. One means to the end ofpennitted dev iati on from the mandated treatment is a 'scope exception' -a rule that rule excludes stated transacti ons or items.SoI GAAP 's complex derivati ve rul es prov ide a good example, with their nin e exceptions to the definition of derivati ve, several of which carne into the rules solely for the purpose of redu cing preparation cost s.~· \ Altern ati vely, constituents request and anain ' trea tment exceptions' -spec ial rul es for defin ed items or industry practi ces. Rules faci li tatin g inco me smoothin g provide a prominent exa mpl e:' " Hav in g won thei r rule-based exceptions, the co nstitu ents then request detail ed instructi o ns res pec ting impl ementation .-'1 FAS B respo nd s, and GAA P becomes still more compl ex.
3. 1 FASB: the responsive standard setter G AA P has ve ry close formati ve ties to the profess ion th aI applies it , ties cl oser eve n th an those between US legisl atures and judges and the lega l professionals who adv ise corporate c li ents. Gove rnment mand ates di ctate much of th e advice lawyers give to cli ent s. But the gove rnment , although heavil y popul ated with lawyers, operates at arm 's length from the legal profess ion. Acco untin g, in co ntras t, operates like a guild both at the leg islati ve and at the profess ional leve l. A uditors appl y law generated within their own profession, operatin g at cl oser quarters with the pertin ent law making in stituti ons than do lawyers. The governance structure of FAS B de monstrates thi s prox imity. At first g lance it appears designed to preve nt the large auditin g firms from dominating the body that makes GAAP. Public accountant s may fill no more than three of FASB 's seven seats, with the remainin g fo ur seats bein g taken by two corporate exec uti ves , one fin ancial anal yst, and one academi c.-~ On further co ns ideration, however, th e four to three split does not prov id e a credibl e guarantee aga inst spec ial interest influ ence. Auditors and corporate audit cl ients will have a co mmunity of inlerest on most ho t button stand ard setting issues. FAS B, by co uplin g three auditors with two corporate exec uti ves, ass ures that thi s communit y of interest has a fi ve-to-two votin g advantage. FAS B also is il ve ry small shop, with a staff of onl y forty-fi ve. For fundin g, it has hi stori call y reli ed on the charitable support of the large audit firm s, along with a tri ckl e of reve nues fro m publi cati on sal es.~'J Add all of thi s up, and the stru cture does not guarantee robust in stitu tional ind ependence for G AA P's standard se tter.
With th is incent ive proble m in mind , let us rev isit FAS B' s wi thdrawa l orits two decades old project loo kin g toward a suhSl<lncL'-ovc r-form approach to defi ning control and imposing consolidation. foe ) Why did FASB give up? It seems unlikely that the decision followed from ajurisprudenti al commitment to rules-based accountin g. More likely FASB abandoned the project because it expected a shift to a standard to trigger voc iferous oppositi on from reporting compani es and the large audit firms because it would have had a restraining effect on the structured fin ance. Securitization is a billion dollar industry. Auditing firms participate as consultants. Reporting companies securi tize their assets to enh ance their bottom lines. Market intermediaries draw enomlOUS revenues from making the deals. To the ex tent that a new consolidation regime would have chilled deals by changing accounting treatments, all of these actors would have gone straight to the barricades to protect the status quo. FASB , after years of being greeted with threats from lobbyists and attack dog congressmen whenever it tried to improve anything, was entitled to be a little gun shy in the face of strong demand for the statu s quo respecting consolidation.
It should be noted that corporate managers do not have the power simpl y to dictate GAAP's terms. GAAP rule-makings are much contested , despite FASS's structural weakness and man agement's capture of the auditor interest. Indeed, FASB has cond ucted itse lf with admirable independence in recent years, taking positions opposed to those of management and the audit profession on key issues like the treatment good will arising in mergers and management stock opti ons.
M Sut FASS ' s structural weakness does bear on the rules versus principles choice in day-to-day standard setting. When empowered cons tituents present F ASB with a standard-setting problem or pose a question about a proposed standard , in either case asking for a solution in the form of a scope or treatment exception, they often get a sympathetic heari ng.
US GAAP accordin gly presents a cogni sab le capture problem. GAAP in many respects result s from an internal conversation, wi th no institutio nal mechani sm assuring that the public interest trumps the interests of audit firms and their clients in its promulgation. Asymmetries of information and methodological wherewithal aggravate the problem. GAAP is a body of law structurally shi elded from outside inspecti on. Monitoring GAAP is difficult -to know what is go ing on respecting substantive iss ues in accounting is to be a member of the guild in the firs t place.
Solidarity within the accounting profession aggravates the problem . This profession closes ranks when a maj or conflict breaks out between it and the rest of the economy. Among the multitude of talking heads from the business world that provided the US medi a wi th its sound bites during recent corporate cri ses, none were partners from the large auditing firms. Even as the rough and tumble .. , See SI/pra n. 40 and accompanying lext. world of public policy di sc ussion suddenl y occ upi ed itself with GAAP and the audit profession, the audit firms stayed s il ent./'~ The silence hardly stemmed from di sinterest. It in stead served to preserve information asymmetry -the less said about audit practi ce outside the profession the better. Industry concentrati o n augments accounting 's professional so lidarity. There remain onl y four firm s left with the wherewithal to conduct audits of large capitalization companies. In a uni verse of four organizations, di scipline is easil y maintained.
The legal profess ion in the US , with all it s fault s, displays no comparable solidarity. For every lawye r who closes ranks wi th a corporate client, th ere is another lawyer looking to bring suit against that first lawyer' s c1ie m, or, altern ati ve ly, to get the leg islature to authorize a lawsuit. When the corporation' s lawyer goes to Capi tol Hill to ge t the client protecti ve leg islati on, the tri al lawyers also are there, workin g the othe r side. When lawyers advocate for their cl ients in public, they are understood (0 be acting in a special role. Any representati ons they make on clients' behalf concerning the state of the law are greeted with scepticism. Indeed, critique usuall y is assured , for a second lawyer wi ll be charged with arti cul ating the opposi ng view.
Accou ntant s operate differeml y as a profess ion; even as they ha ve come more and more resembl e lawyers in playi ng an advocacy role for their clients. Where with lawyers the advocacy appears in briefs and memoranda of law, with accounting the advocacy merges into the numbers reported on the clients' certifi ed financials. Readers of fin anci al report s have not been on notice to bring sceptici sm to bear, at least until very rece ntl y. And th ose who do proceed cautiously get o nl y indirec t mean s with in the repofts' four com ers with whi ch to sort numbers influenced by advocacy fro m harder numbers unjnfluenced by management' s agenda. This does not go to say that finan cial reports always are ta ken at face va lue. In theory , Wall Street's fin anc ial anal ys ts pla y the criti cal fun cti on. Unfortu nately, in recem prac ti ce they too have lacked the incentive to criticize./'\ Nor can we ass ume that a vigo rous critiqu e will eman ate from within the account ing profess ion, for it has no segme nt with a financial stake in arti cu· lalin g adversary positi ons. The entire burden of critique and con'eclion has devo lved on FASB , the SEC accou ntin g office/'"' and a handful of academi cs.
"" We must put to one side Arthur Andersen's Joe Berardi no. who publ ic ly and unsuccessfully acted OLit the role of the CEO trying to quell an organizational conflagrat ion .
.. , The incentive problem stems from undelwriting and o ther rent streams nowing from the issuers of financ ial repons to the employers of analysts. It is nO{ clear that the problem admits of an easy solution. Absent lhal comlpling rent now. it is not d ear that resources exist to support an adequate llow of critical analysis. Restating the point. reform implies a new plicillg stmclUre for the audit.
,,' The SEC had the power 10 impose accou nting rules prior to SOA. See 15 U.S .c. ss. 77(a), 7Hrn(b)( I) ( 1994). The SEC exercises ils power o nly rarely. prefenillg 10 leave the job to FASB. :ll"! ing. under Ihe threal of intervent ion should the SEC's preferences nOI be satis ried. Herwi tz & Barrett. op. cit. 11 . 19. p. t46.
Audit Firm Demands
Auditors are inclined toward cooperatio n with their cl ients and will tend to support their clients' reporting objecti ves. Competiti on for consulting business aggravates the inclinati on. Auditors also are di sincl ined to say no to their clients. Jt foll ows that before so doing they will seek the backing of a precise negati ve in structi on in GAAP. The rul e denudes the negati ve response to the client of any suggesti on that the nay-say ing stems from the auditor 's own pro fess ional judgment. The ex tern al authority takes the bl ame. Un der the prev ailing relational pattern , audit cl ients balk at negati ve auditor demands absent a precise writtenjuslifi cati on: 'S how me where it says I can ' t do th is." '\ This profess ional dynami c ge nerates a hi gh dema nd for rul es.
The profession's fear of enforcement entang lement strengthens th e preference.
Wi th an open-ended principl e, both the preparer and the auditor make a judgment respecting a law to fact app licati on. Ris k averse actors in thi s posture will be wary of second-guessin g by regul atory authorities."" They fear that the good faith they bring to the principle 's application will be unverifiabl e expos,.
Principles, then, make i1 hard to minimi ze enforcement risk.
It foll ows that 11 hi gh demand for rul es could persist even in the wa ke of an across the board ban o n nonaudit co nsultin g. Recall that the 'check-the-box' allegation again st rul es-based GAA P can be res tated in pos iti ve terms: Rul es enhance veri fiabili ty, causi ng a decrease in di fferences in measurement and making non-compliance more ev ident. Now ass ume, as some assert,h' th aI the audit fi rms engage in intense price competiti on (even as the number of firms eq ui pped to aud it large ca pitali zat ion co mpanies has decreased to four and q uite apart from competiti on for consultin g rents). Such price competition could come at the cost of audi t quality. To see why, hypothesize the incenti ves of an audit partner under pri ci ng press ure. Under Generall y Accepted Auditing Standards, the audit process begin s with an appraisal of the ri sk of compli ance failu re at the client . The auditor's profess ional judgmenl concern ing the scope of the testing to be conducted in the course of the audit fo ll ows from thi s ri sk appraisal.' >· The scope of the tes ting in tu rn impacts on the audit fee -as the risk increases, more tests are needed, more ti me mu st be spent, and the fee rises. Rul es reco mmend themselves over principles in a hard cas h se nse at thi s point in the scenari o. Chec k-the-box verifi ability gets the job done more quickl y and ", SEC Reporr, op. cit. n. 13. s. III.I.
' ", See ibid ., s. I.e. predictably, maki ng it eas ier to state a price in advance and lock in a profit on the engagement. Under a regime of principl es, the preparer wi ll have made fac t se nsitive applicatio ns of the standards, necess itating a more labou r-intensive audit. With principles, unex pected, time-co nsuming prob lems also are more like ly to arise. In sum , professional price co mpetition, (0 the extent it ex ists, also fu els th e demand for rules.
3.3 The legal profession compared US aud itors, in demandi ng rules from their standard se ller. (rack the action s of US lawyers; and US GAAP, in evolvi ng away from hroad principles toward ru les, tracks the evol ution of US business law as a whole. Before telling their cli ents that a course of action is proh ibi ted. lawye rs al so seek an exp lici t statutory bar or a case on all fours. Business law and lawyers no longer subsc ribe to the legal reali sts' view that fact spcc irk adj udi cation un der principles makes law more respo nsive.'" As an ex ample. com pare the o ld Uni form Parlllers hip Act/" drafted early in the twent ieth century, with a Revised Uni fo rm Parlnersh ip Ac t," drafted at the end of the cen tury. The fonn er is a collec ti on of short, general state ments. The latte r is a labyrinthine affa ir that reads li ke an atlempt to answe r every ques tion that ever arose in thi s hi story of partnership governance. T he evol uti on of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) and the cases thereunde r over the la st three decades has worked si mila rl y. New legislati ve dra fts of the uee add layers of compli cations.
Today 's drafters no longer leave it to later case law to fill in the detail s. 1nstead they pursue the impossible dream o f creating compl ete sets of in struction s, just like the accountants . 7~ Meanw hil e, courts applyin g the uce have aba nd oned ge neral ideas like liberal construction H and good faith. 7 " Many reasons for business law 's movement to rul es ca n be suggested. Co nfidence in judicial decision-maki ng has declined even as the expen se of litigating ques ti ons of interpretat ion ha s risen . 1n commercial law contexts the scope of jury control over mi xed law and fac t qu estions expanded materiall y over the 'I Revised Uniform Partnership Act 6 UIA 1 ( 1997). ,; Compare the origi nal UCC Art. 9 and the revised Art. 9 on the perfec tion and prioJities of seclLI'i ty interests. See UCC 5S. 9-30 t-9-318 3A ViA 859-t037. 38 VIA 33-386 ( 1972) ; UCC ss. 9-30 1-9-342.3 VIA 154-30 1 (2000) . To sum up, GAAP and business law have moved to rules simultaneously. Auditors, lawyers, and clients alike demand clear instructions, putting the burden of clarity on the lawmaker. They thereby relieve themselves of the burden of making judgments under uncertainty. Such judgments take time, cost money. and disrupt client relations. This is not a healthy development. But the fault lies neither in the proliferating rulebooks nor their drafters. The fault occurs at the point of demand: Drafters will continue to generate rulebooks until the demand ceases. Actors in practice will perceive the rulebooks to be inflexible and burdensome only wi th the cessation of the forces generating the demand.
RELATIVE MERITS OF RULES AND PRINCIPLES: IDEAL CONDITIONS AND INCENTIVE INCOMPATIBILITY
For the sake of argument, let us assume that the auditor-client demand for greater rule specificity ceases, freeing us to interrogate in a neutral policy space the question whether GAAP should be articu lated in rules or principles. The result will depend on the inquiry 's further assumptions. If an ideal professional environment is hypothesized, in which the auditor works unconstrained by pressures of time, price, and reputation, a strong case can be stated for a principles-based regime. But a plausible case can be stated for rules even under such ideal conditions. The case for rules strengthens materially in an imperfect institutional framework, such as that prevailing respecting the audit function in the US.
Cost savings and transparency
Rules-based accounting entails cost savings and enhances transparency. The cost savings follow from the nature of the subject matter. Accounting standards govern homogenou s, recurrent situations where the actors need ex ante instruction s and have incentives to invest in compliance. '. 42 Dllke Ll. (1992) pp. 557. 570-77. make sense on ly if the costs of consta nt revi sion of the rules to keep up with unintended app li cations due to faulty drafting and regulatory arbitrage outweighed the benefits of advance specifi cati on. GAAP does not appear to lie anywhere near th at level of dysfun cti on. On thi s analys is, the indicated course of reform is incremental change. The standard setter monitors the rules' operation look ing to periodic amendment, adjusting categories so that reportin g resu lt s follow from the rules' operat ive principl es .7~
Transparency imports a second j ustification for rules. Recall that rule co mpliance is more easil y verified than principle compliance. 71 It follows that rules decrease the risk of audit failure even as they import inflexibility.
Rules enh ance tran spare ncy for users of fi nancial statements as well as for auditors. To see why, revi sit the legal realists' case for principles ove r rul es in re spect of private law adj ud ication. That case presupposes that the law to fact appl ication is exp lained and publi shed in ajudicial opini on. The reported cases give the practiti one r an expanding body of fact sensitive appl ications, ever better art ic ul ating the standard 's meaning. Over time, the accum ul ated case law offers the practitioners a level of certainty not dissimilar to that of a rulebook , even as the principle's flexibility is retained. Meanwhile, the cases (and thu s the substance of th e legal regi me) are open fo r public inspection.
The ongo ing rul es-based arl"icu lation of GAAP by FASB and other public bodies works similarly .7~ But the appl ication of open-ended accounting principles by reportin g firm s and audi tors does nol. Financial statements and footnotes are very summary docume nts. Deci sion maki ng about treatmen ts goes on in a black box, evolving as a matte r of practice amongst insiders."N There is no comparable moment of tran spa rency respec ting the law to fa ct applicatio n. Thi s dimini shes the chance for ou tside evaluation. These law-to~ fact deci sions, meanw hil e, are not made by j udges empowered by the state. Th ey come from the prepa rers -the regul ated ac tors themselves -acting with an in put of th e auditor's professional review. And a professional , even one hi storically co nceived to be in an adversary posture to its client, is in a materiall y different position from a j udge. Adj ud icatory authority imports absolute power to say no. The outside professional can only suggest no, on pain of giving up the client.
When confronting substandard fin ancials, loday's auditors are di sinclined even to threaten to walk, much less actuall y to forego the rent flowin g from the audit engagement. A serious incenti ve problem results, a problem that makes a move to fl ex ibl e, open-ended principles ill advised at thi s time.
Flexibility and professional judgment
The case for principles-based accounting arises in large measure from the descripti on of the perverse effects of rules. The principles case admits the force of the rul es case but asserts that once rules come to dominate the accounting regime, cumulative perverse effects cause the di sadvantages of rules to outweigh the advantages. The more detail ed the set of exceptions, the greater the chance that essenti ally similar tran sactions receive different accounting treatments. Scope and treatment exceptions build inconsistencies into the stand ard s, sacrificin g the integrity of the underl ying principles. Strategic behav iour results, as preparers seek to exploit the inconsistencies, des ignin g compli ant transactions that subvert the principles the rules supposedly effectu ate. Meanwhil e, the proliferating exceptions fu el additional demand for explication from the standard setter. The responsive standard setter finds itself attempting to articul ate a treatment for every conceivable scenario. But the auempt always fails, for the goal of a perfec t, exhausti ve rulebook is unattainable. 1IO The case for principles at thi s point reverses the case for rules. Since the standard setter cannot identify all pertinent business situations ex ante, it is not clear why ex hausti ve instructi ons should be he ld out as a goal in the first place, given that micro-level standard setting always results in inconsistencies. The onl y party with all inform ati on respecting a given tran saction is the reporting company itself. It foll ows thatlhe company's preparer, operating in good fai th , is more likel y to deri ve an appropriate treatment when applyin g a principle than is a rulernaking standard setter acting ex ante. With principles, companyspecific knowledge and the regulatory framework interact fl exibly and the regul ation's purpose is more likely to be effectuated.~' Thus described, principles-based accounting not only permits but also requires exercises of professional judgment by auditors and actors at reporting companies. R2 Sir David T weedie, chairman of the lASB , stressed the importance 'We favo ur an approach that requires the com pany and its auditor to take a step back and consider whether the accounting suggested is consistent with the underlyin g principle. Thi s is not a soft option. Our appro<lCh 1\~q Llire s both companies and their auditors to exercise professional judgment in ti ll' puhlil' interest. Our approach requires a strong commitment fro m preparers to i"inancial statements that provide a fai th ful representati on of all transacti ons and a stron g l'Ollllllilment from auditors to res ist client pressures. It wi ll not work withoutlhl'sl' L'o llllnitments .. .'K.'
Ha ving heard th e case for principles, we must rl'! urn III til l' audito r-cl ient relationship to inquire into the expected quality or pnllcssillilill judg me nt s. If recent hi story is predicti ve, the prognosis is not good. 1':vL'1l as iluditors have been disempowe red with res pect to the ir c li ent s. so IIll' l'liL'llIS ha v..: bl:l:1l g uided by short-term so lic itude for the ir stoc k pricl:s ratlll'l' than i"iddit y 10 illTounting princ ipl es. Proponents of princ ipl es see m 10 hc li l'Vl' Ih ;ll rdorlllulatin g. rules into standard s by itse lf solves these problell is. (jUI thl: bl:\ icl' is unfounded. The recent hi story of aud it failure has been no res pecte r or princ iples . It w ill take more than a new approac h to sl<lnd<lrd se ttin g brin g incentive compatibility to thi s comp li ance e nvironment.
The SEC displays sensiti vil y to thi s problem in its SOA re port on principlesbased account ing. Th e repo rt' s defini tion of an ideal prin c iples-based standard makes an inte res ting com pari son wi th Sir David Tweedi e's approach:
.... [T]he optimal principles-based accounting standard in volves a conci se statement of substant ive accounting princi ples where the accou ntin g objective has been incorporated as an integral part of the standard and where few, jf any, exceptions or inter· nal inconsistencies are included in the standard. Further, such a standard should prov ide an appropri ate amount of implementation guidance given the nature of the c lass of transactions or events and should be devoid of bright-line tests. Finall y, such a standard should be consistent with , and deri ve from , a coherent conceptual framework of financ ial reporting. ,<,
Where Tweedi e lays the responsibili ty for law to fact determina tion s sq uarely o n the regulated actors, the SEC hesitates. It takes a step back from the case for principles to e ndorse constituent de mand for speci fi c ity. It the n shifts th e burden bac k 10 the standard sette r to provide 'a n appropriate amount of "' Testimony of Sir Duvid Tweedie Before the Senate Comrnillee o n Banking. Ho using and Urb'lIl Affairs ( 14 February 2(02). implementation guidance.' Bald statements of principles, says the SEC, provide users insufficient structure in which to frame their professional judgment. The 'principles' need to be 'defined specifically.' The SEC calls this an 'objectives-oriented' approach to principles-based standard setting. As an exemplar, it holds out PASS's recent revision of the standard for mergers.
ttI
The regime envisaged by the SEC appears to hold out the benefit of a decrease in the level of reporting detail. At the same time, comparability of treatment across different issuers would be enhanced. But the decrease in complexity implies a concomitant loss of tran sparency, since commonality of treatment obscures particulars in the economics of differing underlying transactions.
M The SEC sees these as matters to be traded off by the standard setter: '[T]he task of the standard setter [is] to determine the trade offs among relevance, reliability, and comparability C ... ) in ( ... ) an effort to find the "sweet spot,,·87. Two additional SEC instructions to the standard setter stand out: (1) economic substance should drive the development and scope of the standards,&!! and (2) no scope and treatment exceptions should be conceded. 89 A question must be asked about the SEC's vision of accounting standards. How does the regime simultaneously articulate precise instructions and eschew all exceptions from its categories? So doing would amount to a considerable achievement. The drawing of lines is intrinsic to regulation. Line-drawing is what case law under principles is supposed to do. It is not at all clear that financial reporting principles differ from any other body of regulations in this regard. So, to the extent the SEC looks toward a new regime in which all standards mesh like the parts of a well-running machine, it is likely to be disappointed. Such perfect engineering is no more likely here than in any other regulatory context. 1IO The search for 'sweet spots' is better consigned to sporting and other physical activities.
The SEC, in its search for a regime of broadly stated standards that incorporate no exceptions, might be better off abandoning the rubric of principlesbased accounting. The system envisioned more accurately would be characterized as a one of tough, general rules. 9 1 Such a regime holds out advantages. For example, it presumably would prohibit whole classes of aggressive treatments tolerated in recent years, particularly those facilitating earnings management. But if this is the SEC's intent, a question arises: In the present political and 'OJ See FASB, Principles Approach, op. cit. n. 20, p 6. ,,' FASS's Proposal respecting Principles in effect warns audit firms and issuers of this when il poinls out that principles will mean more volatility in reported earni ngs figures. Ibid, in stitutional contex t how likely is it that reporting companies, their audirors, and thei r fr iend s in Washington wou ld permit FASB to use the rubric of principles-based accou nting to usher in a new era of strict treatments? Even as the PCAOB takes steps to reg ulate the a udit profess ion, the an swer mu st be, ve ry unlikely.
As a practi ca l matter, then, the projected move to principles will have to be arr iculated in the form of general but flexible guidelines -what lawye rs call 'standards. "" Choices of trea tment will have to be made and th e quality of preparer and aud itor judgments wi ll matter. The SEC warns that principles-based accoun ting im plicates a more expens ive, time-consumin g audi t process. The SEC anti cipates that , in order to rev iew preparer judgment s, audit firm s will have to hire ex pe nsive personnel with experti se in comple x tran sactions. II al so anticipates that acti ve audit comm illee oversight and olh er strong enforce ment agents wi ll be required if the system is lO work . Finally, it advi ses audit ors and preparers to generate ex ten sive paper records respecting treatm ent deci sions so as to pos ition th emse lves to defend their good faith .'"
In effec t the SEC as ks users of fin ancial statements to tru st in the effec tiveness of the PCAOB to create a compl iance environmc nt vc ry different from the one preva ilin g -a wonderful new wo rl d o f accountin g. Th e qu es tion is not whether the reg ime it projects would he an impro vc llll' llt on the statu s quo; it wo uld be. The quesLion is whet her the ideal world thu s projl'l· tCtl is J"c;'ls ible in prac ti ce with out uni ntend ed e ffects in the form of poor profess ional judgment s. It is too soon in the US reform process for an affirmati ve an swe r.
CONCL USI ON
US GAAP, even as il has moved to rul es, continues to contai n many principles and holds out many choices of treatment. Indepe nd ent auditors are supposed to make reference 10 the principl es in filling in the ine vitable gaps in the rules and in answe ring ques ti ons of interpretation under the ru les. Such law to fac t appl ica ti ons should with some frequency have bee n leadin g auditors to say no to agg ressive treatmen ts chosen by their clients. But such nay sayi ng has not been the practi ce. Appl ication o f principles in the mann er contemplat ed requires exercises of judgment , exercises th ai captured a uditors are di sabled from 
